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Abstract 
  
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) are becoming increasingly popular as more 
and more mobile devices find their way to the public, besides “traditional” uses such as 
military battlefields and disaster situations they are being used more and more in every-
day situations. With this increased usage comes the need for making the networks secure 
as well as efficient, something that is not easily done as many of the demands of network 
security conflicts with the demands on mobile networks due to the nature of the mobile 
devices (e.g. low power consumption, low processing load). The concept and structure of 
MANETs make them prone to be easily attacked using several techniques often used 
against wired networks as well as new methods particular to MANETs. Security issues 
arise in many different areas including physical security, key management, routing and 
intrusion detection, many of which are vital to a functional MANET.  
In this paper we focus on the security issues related to ad hoc routing protocols in 
particular. The routing in ad hoc networks remains a key issue since without properly 
functioning routing protocols, the network simply will not work the way it’s intended to. 
Unfortunately, routing may also be one of the most difficult areas to protect against 
attacks because of the ad hoc nature of MANETs. We will present the main security risks 
involved in ad-hoc routing as well as the solutions to these problems that are available 
today.  
 
Ad-Hoc Routing Protocols  
1) General considerations about ad-hoc routing protocols  
a) Types of ad-hoc Routing protocols  
There are mainly two types of ad-hoc routing protocols:  
1. Proactive routing protocols, where the nodes keep updating their 
routing tables, by sending periodical messages. We have, for example, 
OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing protocol) and TBRPF (Topology 
Broadcast based on Reverse Path Forwarding)  
2. Reactive (On Demand) routing protocols, where routes are created 
only when needed. We have, for example, DSR (Dynamic Source Routing 
protocol) and AODV (Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing 
protocol)  
 
 
 
Examples of adhoc routing protocols 
 
b) Desired characteristics of ad-hoc routing protocols  
• Ad-hoc routing protocols have some special requirements:  
• Distributed operation  
• Loop freedom  
• Demand-based operation  
• Sleep period operation  
• Unidirectional link support  
• Security  
c) Ad-hoc network’s security characteristics  
The characteristics of the Ad-hoc network’s security are,  
• Availability  
• Confidentiality  
• Integrity  
• Authentication  
• Non-repudiation  
 
2) Problems with ad-hoc routing protocols: causes  
 
In ad-hoc routing protocols, nodes exchange information with each other about 
the network topology, because the nodes are also routers. This fact is also an important 
weakness because a compromised node could give bad information to redirect traffic or 
simply stop it. Moreover, we can say that routing protocols are very brittle in term of 
security. This part aims to provide a description of the causes of the problems with ad-
hoc routing protocols.  
a) Infrastructure of ad-hoc networks:  
Ad-hoc networks have no predetermined fixed infrastructure, that’s why 
the nodes themselves have to deal with the routing of packets. Each node relies on 
the other neighboring nodes to route packets for them.  
b) Dynamic topology of ad-hoc networks:  
The organization of the nodes may change because of the mobility-aspect 
of ad-hoc networks: they contain nodes that may frequently change their 
locations. Because of this fact, we talk about the dynamic topology of these 
networks, which is a main characteristic that causes problems: when several ad-
hoc networks mix together, there can be duplications of IP addresses, and 
resolving it is not so simple. Then, attacks can easily occur by using this 
duplication of IP address (cf. attacks using impersonation)  
c) Problems associated with wireless communication:  
Wireless channels have a poor protection to noise and signal interferences, 
therefore routing related control messages can be tampered. A malicious intruder 
can just spy on the line, jam, interrupt or distort the information circulating within 
this network.  
d) Implicit trust relationship between neighbors: 
Actual ad-hoc routing protocols suppose that all participants are honest. 
Then, this directly allows malicious nodes to operate and try to paralyze the whole 
network, just by providing wrong information. 
 
Possible Attacks In Ad-Hoc Routing Protocols  
 
Due to their particular architecture, ad-hoc networks are more easily attacked than 
wired network. We can distinguish two kinds of attack: the passive attacks and the active 
attacks. A passive attack does not disrupt the operation of the protocol, but tries to 
discover valuable information by listening to traffic. Instead, an active attack injects 
arbitrary packets and tries to disrupt the operation of the protocol in order to limit 
availability, gain authentication, or attract packets destined to other nodes.  
The routing protocols in MANET are quite insecure because attackers can easily 
obtain information about network topology. Indeed in AODV and DSR protocols, the 
route discovery packets are carried in clear text. So a malicious node can discover the 
network structure just by analyzing this kind of packets and may be able to determine the 
role of each node in the network. With all these information more serious attacks can be 
performed in order to disturb the network operation by isolate important nodes, etc. Let 
us see the different attacks possible by using modification first, then by using 
impersonation and finally the attacks using fabrication.  
1) Attacks using modification:  
One of the simplest ways for a malicious node to disturb the good operation of an ad-hoc 
network is to announce better routes (to reach other nodes or just a specific one) than the 
other nodes. This kind of attack is based on the modification of the metric value for a 
route or by altering control message fields (Denial Of Service attacks).  
 
Figure 1 
 
For example, in the network illustrated in the Figure 1, a malicious node “Hacker” 
could keep traffic from reaching the node D by consistently advertising to the node B a 
shorter route to the node D than the route to D that C is advertising.  
a) Redirection by changing the route sequence number  
In ad-hoc networks, like in wired networks, the better path to reach a destination 
node is determined by a specific value, which is the metric and is often the element, 
which determines the better route. Smaller this value is, better is the route. That’s why a 
simple way to attack a network is to change this value with a smaller number than the last 
“better” value.  
In the figure 1 we have shown that a malicious node called “Hacker” try to insert 
itself to the network in order to disturb its operation. When the node A wants to 
communicate with the node D, it broadcasts a message asking all the nodes around the 
better path to reach the node D. B will received the message and forward it. The node C 
will reply that it has a direct route to D and in this reply message; it will give a value for 
the metric. Now if the malicious node replies to the node B too that it has a direct route to 
the node D with a smaller metric value than C, B will consider this route as the best one 
and delete the path with the node C. The result in the example is shown in the figure 2 
below.  
 
 
b) Redirection with modified hop count (specific to AODV protocol)  
When a node cannot decide what the best route is regarding to different metrics, it 
can use the number of hops to decide which path is the best route to reach a specific 
node. This is the case in the AODV protocol. In this case, the protocol uses the hop count 
value to determine the best route. Also a malicious node can disturb the network too, by 
announcing a smallest hop count value to reach the node. In general, hackers use the 
value zero to be sure to have the smallest hop count value.  
 
c) Denial Of Service (DOS) attacks with modified source routes  
The DOS attack is well-known in computer security and can be efficient in ad-hoc 
networks without secure routing protocols. A simple way to understand the operation of 
DOS attacks is to see the figure 2.  
In this figure, a malicious node is located in the network. If the node A wants to 
communicate with the node E, it sends data packets following its route cache to the node 
E including the malicious node. Also when the malicious node will receive the data 
packets, it can change the header of these packets in order to abort the transmission of the 
data.  
 
Figure 2 
2) Attacks using impersonation  
These attacks are called spoofing since the malicious node hide its real IP address 
or MAC address and uses another one. As current ad-hoc routing protocols like AODV 
and DSR do not authenticate source IP address, a malicious node can launch many 
attacks by using spoofing. For example, a hacker can create loops in the network to 
isolate a node from the remainder of the network. To do this, the hacker just has to take 
IP address of other node in the network and then use them to announce new route (with 
smallest metric) to the others nodes. By doing this, he can easily modify the network 
topology as he wants.  
3) Attacks using fabrication  
We can distinguish three kinds of attacks using fabrication. They are,  
a) Falsifying route error messages  
The first attack is quite common in AODV and DSR because these two protocols 
are using path maintenance to recover the good path when some nodes have moved. The 
weakness of this architecture is that when a node moves, the closest node sends an 
“error” message to the others to inform them that the route is no more available. If a 
malicious node usurps the identity of another node by using spoofing and send error 
messages to the others, the other nodes will update their routing tables with this 
information. Also the malicious node may insulate any node quite easily.  
b) Corrupting routing state: route cache poisoning  
This is a passive attack that can occur in DSR especially because of the 
promiscuous mode of updating routing table which is employed by DSR. This occurs 
when information stored in routing table at routers is deleted, altered or injected with 
false information. Indeed, in addition to learning routes from headers of packets, which a 
node is processing along a path, routes in DSR may also be learned from promiscuously 
received packets. A node overhearing any packet may add the routing information 
contained in that packet's header to its own route cache, even if that node is not on the 
path from source to destination.  
The vulnerability of this system is that an attacker could easily exploit this 
method of learning routes and poison route caches. For example, the hacker just has to 
broadcast a message with a spoofed IP address in the other nodes around. When they will 
receive this message, the nodes would add this new route to their cache and also 
communicate now with this route to reach a special node (the malicious node in fact 
instead of the one with the same IP address as the hacker’s node).  
c) Routing table overflow attack  
If the ad-hoc network is using a “proactive” protocol, it means that the protocol 
algorithm try to find routing information even before they are needed. (Instead of 
“reactive” protocol which do this after). This is a vulnerability used by this attack, 
because the attacker attempts to create route to non-existent nodes. If he creates enough 
routes, new routes cannot be created anymore because of an overwhelming pressure of 
the protocol.  
d) Other attacks using fabrication  
Replay attack: an attacker sends old advertisements to a node causing it to  
update its routing table with stale routes.  
Black hole: an attacker advertises a zero metric for all destinations causing  
all nodes around it to route packets towards it.  
 
Solutions To Security Problems In Ad-Hoc Routing Protocols  
 
In order to provide solutions to the security issues involved we must first establish 
that there are different kinds of ad-hoc networks and the different types of networks put 
different demands on the infrastructure and also determines what means are available to 
improve security. In ad-hoc networks are divided into the following categories:  
• Open  
This type of environment is characterized by the lack of any infrastructure that 
one can use in order to maintain security. The nodes present in an open environment can 
be of any type and not necessarily known beforehand. Therefore any kind of central 
authority system that requires prior knowledge of the nodes in the network is not going to 
work. Typically this is not a very common environment and the extreme openness it 
presumes also limits the available security measures a great deal.  
• Managed-Open  
The managed-open environment is probably the one where most research is being 
done today as it is the type of environment we are most likely to see expand in the nearest 
future .In this type of environment there the possibility to use already established 
infrastructure to some extent to help us secure the ad-hoc network. This opens up a whole 
new range of strategies using certificate servers and other similar software to provide a 
starting point of the security in the network.  
• Managed-Hostile  
This is perhaps the classic ad-hoc environment and it’s described as nodes in a 
military war-zone, or perhaps in a disaster area. Here security is the primary goal and 
even information such as the location of the nodes involved is considered very sensitive 
information. In this type of environment security is considered to be much more 
important than performance and as such the security measures can be made a bit more 
extreme.  
Depending on the type of network environment, different types of security-
enhancing techniques have been developed, each of which tries to minimize the security 
risks while still keeping within the bounds set up by the particular environment. There are 
two main different approaches to designing the techniques: adding enhancements to 
existing protocols and creating new protocols from the ground up. They are, 
 
1) Protocol enhancements  
These techniques are basically enhancements that, if not mentioned otherwise, can 
be applied to any of the current ad-hoc routing protocols in use today.  
a) Security-Aware ad hoc Routing, SAR  
SAR is an attempt to use traditional shared symmetric key encryption in order to 
provide a higher level of security in ad-hoc networks. SAR can basically extend any of 
the current ad hoc routing protocols without any major issues.  
While current ad hoc routing protocols are successful at finding the shortest path 
to any node within the network, SAR extends this function by finding the shortest path 
providing a requested trust level. The different trust levels are implemented using shared 
symmetric keys. In order for a node to forward or receive a packet it first has to decrypt it 
and therefore it needs the required key. Any nodes not on the requested trust level will 
not have the key and cannot forward or read the packets  
 
 
Figure 4 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the difference in route path selection between SAR and a 
normal ad-hoc routing protocol choosing the shortest routing path. The arrows represent 
route hops.  
Every node sending a packet decides what trust level to use for the transfer and 
thereby decides the trust level required by every node that will forward the packet to its 
final destination.  
SAR is indeed secure in the way that it does ensure that only nodes having the 
required trust level will read and reroute the packets being sent. Unfortunately, SAR still 
leaves a lot of security issues uncovered and still open for attacks:  
• Nothing is done to prevent misbehaving (and thereby possibly malicious) nodes 
from being used for routing, as long as they have the required key  
• If a malicious node somehow retrieves the required key the protocol is still open 
for all kinds of attacks mentioned previously  
There is one other main drawback to using SAR and that is the excessive encrypting 
and decrypting required at each hop. Because we are dealing with mobile environments 
the extra processing leading to increased power consumption can be a problem, 
depending on the kind of mobile devices being used.  
SAR is intended for the managed-open environment as it requires some sort of 
key distribution system in order to distribute the trust level keys to the correct devices.  
b) Secure Routing Protocol, SRP  
Secure Routing Protocol, SRP, is another protocol extension that can be applied to any of 
the most commonly used protocols today. The basic idea of SRP is to set up a security 
association (SA) between the source and the destination node. The SA is usually set up 
by negotiating a shared key based on the other party’s public key, and after that the key 
can be used to encrypt and decrypt the messages. The routing path is always sent along 
with the packets, unencrypted though (since none of the intermediate nodes have 
knowledge of the shared key), thus exposing network infrastructure information to 
potential attackers. In fact one of the main security issues in SRP is that it has no defense 
against the “invisible node” attack that simply puts itself (and possibly a large number of 
other invisible nodes) somewhere along the message path without adding itself to the 
path, thereby causing potentially big problems as far as routing goes.  
c) The Selfish Node  
The selfish node is based on one of Darwin’s theories of evolution within birds, 
where birds are divided into suckers (always helping others), cheats (never helping, 
always receiving help) and grudgers (help those that help them). The theory states that 
eventually the suckers die first, and then the cheats (since the grudgers won’t help them) 
and the grudgers will reign. This concept is moved to the open environment ad hoc 
networks in order to help avoid maliciously behaving nodes.  
The open environment poses quite a few new threats to ad-hoc networks. Among 
others, it is very difficult to recognize a malicious node using certificates since the idea of 
this kind of environment is that different devices, presumably from very different 
locations and owners, cooperate to create a functioning network. Since the main goal of 
such a network is high throughput the simplest and therefore most probable form of 
attack targeting the main goal is a DOS-attack, and this is what they’re trying to prevent.  
Using suitably sized cost and profit to routing and forwarding the goal is to more or less 
isolate misbehaving (possibly malicious) nodes. The following components are used in 
order to try and keep network throughput at a maximum: 
• The Monitor  
This component acts as a sort of a “neighborhood-watch”, where nodes try to 
detect bad behavior in nodes in their vicinity. Bad behavior that can be detected can be 
unusually high routing traffic (possible “Black Hole” attack), unusually frequent routing 
updates (“flooding”) and more. Of course, reasonable thresholds must be used in order 
for this to work. When bad behavior is detected an alarm signal is sent to the reputation 
system.  
• The Reputation System  
This is basically a rating of nodes and what their reputation is. Depending on 
reported alarms and alarms experienced by the node itself different nodes are rated 
differently. This component can also use a rumor spreading system to inform other nodes 
of bad behaving nodes reputation. This way a malicious node will quickly become 
“notorious” among the other nodes.  
• The Path Manager  
The path manager is responsible for taking the appropriate changes in routing 
tables as alarms and reputations changes in the system, deletion of malicious behaving 
nodes from routing tables for instance.  
• The Trust Manager  
The trust manager maintains a list of nodes and how much they are trusted. When 
an alarm is received depending on how trustworthy the reporting node is, different 
actions can be taken, since we of course don’t want to leave ourselves open for attacks 
where malicious nodes tries to ban other nodes by sending false alarms.  
Each of these components exists within each node and they all help to keep the network 
alive. The result is a network that in a sense learns that some of the nodes are malicious 
and therefore isolate them.  
Indeed this is a very different approach then the other mentioned systems but keep 
in mind that this is the only one really intended for the open environment, with nodes of 
unknown origin cooperating to achieve maximum network throughput. That is why it is 
focused on different kinds of DOS attacks and not concentrating on encrypting traffic and 
such. Also note that in the open environment no use of existing infrastructure is to be 
used, which leaves the previously mentioned systems useless since they more or less all 
require existing infrastructure (i.e. certificate servers).  
2) Secure protocols  
These are protocols designed from the ground up to provide ad-hoc networks with all the 
required features described earlier.  
a) Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Networks, ARAN  
ARAN is a protocol designed to provide secure communications in managed-open 
environments. Like SAR it makes use of existing infrastructure in the form of certificate 
servers. The protocol has two phases, authentication and transmission.  
1. Authentication  
The goal of the first phase is to make sure that a secure path from the source node 
A and the destination node B can be established. The phase requires that each node has 
received a certificate from a trusted certificate server. The certificate contains a node’s IP 
number, public key as well as the time of issuing and expiration.  
Node A broadcasts a signed (using A’s key) route discovery packet (RDP) to all its 
neighboring nodes in order to find a route to B. Each node that receives the RDP for the 
first time removes any other intermediate(not A) node’s signature, signs the RDP using 
its own key and broadcasts it to all its neighboring nodes, saving a route pair (A,B) in its 
routing table. This continues until node B eventually receives the packet. Node B then 
sends a reply packet containing its own certificate and signed using its key, the packet is 
sent along the reverse path (each intermediate node sends it back to where the original 
RDP came from). When A receives the REP packet, it’s checks that the signature is 
correct and stores node B’s certificate to use in the next phase.  
The procedure does ensure loop freedom as well as makes sure that B really is B using 
the certificates (providing of course that the certificate server has not been compromised). 
One of the downsides to this procedure is that each node has to store the source-
destination routing pairs instead of just routing based on destination which is used in 
other protocols.  
2. Transmission  
A now needs to discover the shortest path to B and therefore sends a “Shortest 
Path Confirmation”, SPC, packet to all its neighbors, encrypted using B’s public key. 
Each successive intermediate node encrypts the message again using B’s public key, 
including its own certificate, and forwards it to its neighbors. When B eventually receives 
the SPC packet it checks all of the signatures and replies to the first SPC received, as well 
as all other SPCs having a shorter recorded path (the path is recorded in the encrypted 
keys). B then sends a “Recorded Shortest Path”, RSP, packet back to A, including the 
path to use in the packet. A can safely verify that it comes from B and that it corresponds 
to the original SPC sent. This way A now has a shortest, secure path to B to transmit data 
over.  
Since at all forwarding the packet is re-encrypted using B’s public key, only B is 
able to discover the actual route taken. This way any spoofing attacks or other attempts to 
misdirect the packets will fail since the malicious nodes first would have to crack the 
encryption. Only using B’s private key would that be possible. Hence, the so called 
“invisible node-attack” is also prevented using this protocol.  
One of the main issues using ARAN is the required certificate server, which means that 
the integrity of that server is vital. This is by design though and as it is intended for an 
managed-open environment it shouldn’t be considered a big issue.  
 
b) Secure Position Aided Ad hoc Routing, SPAAR  
The Secure Position Aided Ad hoc Routing, SPAAR, protocol was developed 
with the classical managed-hostile environment in mind, thus meant to provide a very 
high level of security, sometimes at the cost of performance. Among other things, 
SPAAR also requires that each device use a GPS locator to determine its position, 
although some leeway is given to nodes using a so-called “locator-proxy” if absolute 
security is not required.  
The certificate system is similar to ARAN in that a combination of a public key 
and the public key of the certificate server is used, although in SPAAR a third key is also 
generated, a group neighborhood key that is used to decrypt Route Request packets, 
RREQ. In SPAAR packets are only accepted between neighboring nodes one hop away 
from each other, this is to avoid the “invisible node-attack”. Besides certificates nodes 
also use the location of the other nodes when attempting to communicate, a maximum 
distance N is set that decides how far away a node can be and still be called a neighbor.  
The basic transmission procedure is quite similar to ARAN, although the group 
neighborhood key is used for encryption in order to ensure one-hop communication only. 
Since all nodes also have information on their location they only forward RREQs if their 
position is closer to the destination position. In the destination node reply the location and 
velocity-vector of the destination is returned, this is necessary since the source node 
needs to know the approximate location of the destination in order for the routing to be 
efficient.  
SPAAR may seem a bit extreme, using multiple keys and GPS location-dependent 
routing. Considering the nature of the managed-hostile environment this is not very 
strange. In the situations this environment presents, finding the geographically shortest 
path can be at least as important as finding the fastest path, whether its in a battle field or 
a disaster area. Also, it reveals no information on the network layout to any non-
authorized nodes, something which also can be essential when relay stations are secret.  
The only real security problem currently discovered in SPAAR is once again the 
usage of the certificate server and the extreme need to keep this server uncompromised. 
Also, issues still exist with compromised nodes already having valid certificates.  
 
Conclusion:  
 
Thus Ad-hoc networks are prove to various kinds of vulnerable attacks since they 
are dynamic, wireless and infrastructure less network. Besides all these hazards there are 
the presence of security routing protocols which make them more secure and error-free 
networks there by admiring the ultimate aim of Ad-hoc networks that is the 
accomplishment of instant network regardless of the types of nodes or type of 
environments that is prevailing which is described in this paper. 
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